The role of monitors in patients undergoing general anaesthesia was studied by analysing the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study; 1256 (63%) were considered applicable to this study. In 52% of these a monitor detected the incident first; oximetry (27%) and capnography (24%) detected over half of the monitor detected incidents, the electrocardiograph 19%, blood pressure monitors 12%, a low pressure (circuit) alarm 8%, and the oxygen analyser 4%. Of the other monitors used, 5 first detected 1-2% of incidents, and the remaining 8 less than 0.5% each. The oximeter would have detected over 40% of the monitor detected incidents had its more informative modulated pulse tone always been relied upon instead of the "bleep" of the ECG.
"Only within very narrow boundaries can man observe the phenomena which surround him; most of them naturally escape his senses, and mere observation is not enough. To extend his knowledge, he has had to increase the power of his organs by means of special appliances; at the same time he has equipped himself with various instruments enabling him to penetrate inside of bodies, to dissociate them and to study their hidden parts. A necessary order may then be established among the different processes of investigation or research, whether simple or complex; the first applies to those objects easiest to examine, for which our senses suffice; the second brings within our observations, by various means, objects and phenomena which would otherwise remain unknown to us forever, because in their natural state they are beyond our range:' (Claude Bernard, 1865) I For the vast majority of the anaesthetics given since the advent of modern anaesthesia in 1846, the anaesthetist has relied on close continuous observation of "the objects easiest to examine, for which our senses suffice". It is only in the last twenty years or so that "special appliances" for monitoring have become generally available, and only in the last ten that their use has become widespread. 2 These "special appliances" free the hands of the anaesthetist for other tasks, provide additional information which would otherwise be "beyond our range", facilitate close surveillance of relatively inaccessible patients, and allow a continuous objective record of events to be provided. By the use of audible signals and alarms they can greatly facilitate that most difficult of tasks, the maintenance of vigilance for long periods of time.
However, as all monitoring devices interface in some way with the patient, the patient's breathing system or the gas supply to the patient's breathing system, they also have some potential for giving misleading information or causing harm or complications themselves. 2 It is therefore important that we have some idea of how effective monitors are "in the field", of their rate of success and failure, of the manner in which they fail, and of the problems they may cause.
Also, in the recently published "International Standards for a Safe Practice of Anaesthesia", 3 it is highly recommended that an oxygen supply failure alarm, an oxygen analyser, pulse oximeter, capnograph and electrocardiograph be used for all anaesthetics. 4 As it is inevitable that all of these monitors will not be affordable in many countries, it is desirable, as a guide to those with limited resources, to have some objective idea of the applications and limitations of each device when actually used for clinical anaesthesia. Hence, it was decided to study the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) to determine the role of monitors in patients undergoing general anaesthesia.
METHODS
The first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS were studied. Those which had occurred in association with general anaesthesia and were deemed' 'applicable" to the study (see below for criteria) were analysed to determine how they were detected, i.e. by a person (human detection) or by a monitor (monitor detection). A theoretical assessment was also made as to which of an agreed array of 17 monitors, used in a defined way (see Table 1 ), would have detected each incident had each monitor been used on its own and had the incident been allowed to evolve.
Ten two-hour meetings were held to develop a set of conventions and rules; these were evolved by consensus at each meeting after each author had analysed, scored and discussed a set of 50 incidents which had been handed out at the previous meeting. An attempt was made to describe these sufficiently explicitly to allow similar analyses to be undertaken by other groups. A standard format for "scoring" each incident was agreed upon (see Figure 1 ).
Two hundred randomly chosen incidents from the first 2000 AIMS incidents were allocated to each of the first five authors by the last author as a means of checking on the level of agreement between them. The remaining 1800 incidents were then randomly allocated to these five authors. Each section of the scoring form ( Figure 1 ) was completed for each incident allocated to each of the authors according to the following rules and conventions; assessors were not aware of the identity of the 200 "common" incidents.
Incident Descriptors
Number. Each AIMS report was allocated a number in the order in which it was received. If only one incident was recorded in the report, this number became the number of the incident with the suffix' 'a". If more than one incident was recorded in the report, a new report form was generated for each additional incident (with the relevant details) with the same number but suffixes "b", "c" and so on. (See incidents la and Ib in Figure I.)
Applicability (AINA). An incident was considered applicable for this study only if a monitor would normally be expected to detect it and if it had the potential to cause a significant physiological change in a patient immediately before, during or after general anaesthesia (see incidents la, Ib, 3a, and 4a in Figure  1 ). Incidents were considered "non-applicable" (NA) (see incidents 2a and 5a in Figure 1 ) if: the incident involved local or regional anaesthesia (if a regional block was followed by a general anaesthetic it was only considered if the incident involved the general anaesthetic); the incident was obvious (e.g. the operating table collapsed or the anaesthetist was unable to intubate the patient); it was not amenable to detection by a monitoring device (e.g. no blood had been crossmatched or the wrong patient presented for operation); an equipment problem was detected before induction of anaesthesia; there was failure of equipment which did not affect the patient's physiology, nor have the potential to do so (e.g. monitor failure); the incident involved "a wrong drug" or a "syringe swap" when the drug was given as a bolus. Whether or not to include the latter group was contentious, as although a few of these incidents might have been considered to be monitor detectable, some were "obvious" (e.g. suxamethonium in a conscious patient), some not amenable to monitor detection (e.g. midazolam instead of fentanyl) and some had little or no potential to affect the patient's physiology (e.g. saline instead of an antibiotic). These incidents were not analysed in this study, but are considered elsewhere in this symposium. 5 Flag. A tick was placed in this space if the incident was considered to be particularly interesting or atypical or to provide useful information for teaching purposes Anaesthe.sia and Intensive Care, Ji()/. 21, .No. 5, October, 1993 (see incident 2a in Figure 1 ). These incidents will be the subject of a future publication.
(see incident la in Figure 1 ) or MD (see incidents 1b, 3a and 4a in Figure 1 ).
Actual Incident Detection
Human or Monitor Detection (HDIMD). If an incident was considered "applicable", the means by which the incident was detected was recorded as HD Monitor if MD. If an incident was detected by a monitor the code for that monitor was entered (see Table 1 for codes) (see incidents 1b and 4a in Figure  1 ). If an incident was detected by a monitor not in the array on the form, then it was described in the Situated on anaesthetic machine prior to rotameter bank. Audible alarm when line pressure falls below 50 psi. No scan mode because no analogue or digital display. Sited in the inspiratory limb of the circle system, or distal to the common gas outlet with a T piece. Audible alarm when Fi0 2 < = .19 or Fi02 > = .99. E for hypoxic gas mixtures because it will alarm before the patient becomes hypoxaemic. L for high oxygen concentrations or when the circuit entrains air because detected at 5 minute scan. Sited in the circle for adults or in the expiratory limb of the T piece for children. No scan mode because no digital or analogue display. Audible alarm when circuit pressure > = 50 cm water. Alarms E for obstructed tracheal tube (no potential for patient harm) but L for overpressure of the circuit. Low pressure alarm sited as for the high pressure alarm. E for disconnects but defined not to detect leaks reliably; no scan mode. (Alarms if preset pressure of 10 cm water is not exceeded within 30s.) Pressure gauge sited as for high pressure alarm. L as the patient may not have been ventilated or have been subjected to high airway pressures for up to 5 minutes. (Analogue gauge.) Sited on the expired limb of the circle system and not in use with the T-piece circuit. Defined not to detect reverse flow. L because the patient may have abnormal tidal volumes for 5 minutes (i.e. no alarm). Digital readout. Sited as for high pressure alarm-defined not to detect nitrous oxide. E for wrong volatile agent, but L for wrong settings and disconnects where air is entrained. (Digital readout for volatile agents.) Side-stream sampling sited in breathing circuit close to patient. Has a continuous waveform display. Audible alarm on rebreathing (> 8 mmHg), apnoea (30 seconds), hypocarbia (<!J 20 mmHg) and hypercarbia (> 60 mmHg). E for disconnect, rebreathing, hypercarbia due to equipment problem, accidental extubation (spont. resp.), oesophageal intubation and obstructed tracheal tube. I for leak, laryngospasm and malignant hyperthermia. L for vapour overdose, hyperventilation, severe hypotension, cardiac arrest, bronchospasm, anaphylaxis and pneumothorax.
Modulated bleep. Alarms when saturation < = 90"70. I for hypoxic mixtures, failure to ventilate, gas leaks, oesophageal intubation, endobronchial intubation, obstructed endotracheal tube, overpressure situations, laryngospasm, airway obstruction, bronchospasm, hypoventilation and desaturation. L for vapour overdose, severe hypotension, cardiac arrest, aspiration/regurgitation, malignant hyperthermia, air embolus, anaphylaxis and tension pneumothorax. Audible bleep. L for all changes in heart rate and dysrhythmias as it was felt, particularly in the presence of volatile agents, that the potential for organ damage would exist once there was a change in heart rate. I for malignant hyperthermia because there is time to treat the condition. Audible bleep. Alarms when pulse rate < = 50; pulse rate > = 150. L for all heart rate changes for the same reasons as for pulse meter, and L for ischaemia and cardiac arrest. I for malignant hyperthermia because there is time to treat the condition.
Audible alarm when pressure < = 60 systolic; pressure> = 160 systolic. L when it alarms because there may be the potential for organ damage and L for heart rate changes for the reasons given above.
Audible alarm when pressure < = 60 systolic; pressure> = 160 systolic. L for the same reasons as for invasive pressure, I for malignant hyperthermia for the same reason as above. L for the same reason as for NIBP. L for malignant hyperthermia. L will detect neuromuscular junction blockade in situations not encompassed by any of the conventions in Table 2 . Continuous auscultation by an oesophageal or precordial stethoscope listening to both breath sounds and heart rate and rhythm. E for total failure to ventilate, disconnects, obstructed endobronchial tube. 1 for laryngospasm, airway obstruction, bronchospasm and malignant hyperthermia, L for all conditions leading to heart rate changes. See criteria for both saturation monitor and pulse meter. a The words in "bold" characters will be used to describe each monitor in the text and in other tables. b The codes for these monitors used in Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3 . , E, I, L refer to the time of detection of the incident with respect to patient condition and are defined in the text under "criteria used for scoring each monitor". ./ I for codes and characteristics of each monitor,  see table 2 for scoring conventions, see text for details).
appropriate space (see incident 3a in Figure 1 ). If there was any doubt as to how an incident had been first detected, HD was entered on the form.
Theoretical Incident Detection
Monitors. It was then decided which of the array of 17 monitors would reliably have detected each incident had each been used on its own and had the incident been allowed to evolve. At the initial meetings at which the rules were evolved each monitor was individually "scored" for each incident (e.g. incident la in Figure  1 ). The agreed characteristics of each monitor are summarized in Table 1 and the criteria used for "scoring" each monitor are given below.
Conventions. It became apparent that many situations occurred repeatedly and that it would be necessary only to identify the situation and agree to a "convention"i.e. which monitors would be expected to perform reliably, each to the level of an agreed "score", in that situation, -and enter the code for the convention on the form (see incidents la, Ib and 3a in Figure 1 ). This permitted the scores for each monitor to be entered automatically by manipulating the database. The set of conventions was gradually expanded to that presented in Table 2 . This was done empirically, as the need arose, and not according to any predetermined plan. Once most of the conventions had been agreed upon, they were arranged into the functional groups shown in Table 2 . If no convention was considered appropriate, each such incident was individually scored on the form (see incident 4a in Figure 1 ).
Criteria Used for Scoring of Each Monitor. To more accurately define the theoretical value of each monitor in each situation it was decided to score: 
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The codes and specifications of each monitor are given in Table I "E". "I" and "L" refer to thc tllllC oflhe IIlcident wllh respect 10 lime (first character) and the patient condition (second character) and are defined III the text under "criteria used for scorlllg each oloOllor"
The agreed specifications of each monitor. with some of the reasons \\ hy they were scored "E". "I" or "L" III each situation arc given In T<lblc I Catcgoris.1tion into more specific conventions takes precedence over less specific one (e g TO I. TO) takc precedence o\'er no I and 801 takes precedence o\'er CO I. also T03 would take precedence over R06) Hence many of the "chnical statc" cOl1\'cntlOns (C and R series) are used when the cause IS fI dnlg or CJnnot be identified from the a\all;)blc Information . 1. How long it would take the monitor to detect the problem after the incident occurred. The detection criteria were defined as follows:
CGO Comlllon
• detection would occur within 60 seconds, designated "early" (E); • detection would occur between 60 seconds and 5 minutes, designated "intermediate" (I); • detection would occur at or after 5 minutes, designated "late" (L). If a monitor had no alarm set or no continuous audible signal (e.g. a pressure gauge in the circuit) it was assumed that the "worst case" would apply, i.e. that any abnormality would only be detected at the end of the usual maximum time between "scanning" monitors, i.e. every 5 minutes. Thus, "L" was scored for monitors used in the "scan mode".
At what stage in the evolution of the physiological
insult to the patient the monitor would detect the incident. The detection criteria were defined as follows:
• detection would occur before any measurable or significant physiological change (e.g. an oxygen analyser detecting a hypoxic mixture with its alarm set at 19070), designated "early" (E); • detection would occur when physiological parameters had changed but the patient was not yet at risk of organ damage, designated "intermediate" (I), (e.g. arterial hypoxaemia detected by an oximeter with its "Iow alarm" set at 90070); TABLE 3 • detection would occur when physiological parameters had changed to an extent or in a context in which organ damage could occur, designated "late" (L) (e.g. bradycardia due to hypoxaemia or a reduction in expired carbon dioxide concentration due to air embolism). In Figure I (incidents la and 4a) and Table 2 , the first letter refers to the time after incident detection (1, above) and the second letter to the physiological state (2, above).
Stage. It was agreed that a certain array of monitors would be considered to have been in use during each of 4 defined stages of general anaesthesia (see Table  3 ). This stage was entered for each incident using the abbreviations in Table 3 (see incidents la, 1b, 3a and 4a in Figure I ). For "scoring" each monitor each convention was adjusted for "stage" by manipulating the database.
Characteristics of Each Monitor. In order to allow consistent theoretical analysis of each monitor's potential performance, the characteristics of each monitor were defined (see Table I ); some of the reasons for the scores allotted to each monitor in Table 2 are also given in Table 1 . Where necessary, certain assumptions were made. Unless otherwise stated: the patient's physical status was assumed to be ASA I; for adults the breathing system was assumed to be a circle system, with a fresh gas flow of 3 litres/minute, and the ventilator volume-cycled with rising bellows; for Monitors defined to be in use at different stages of general anaesthesia for the theoretical analysis.
Stage of
Code and usage of each monitor at each stage of anaesthesia. 
REC
From the time the patient is removed from the breathing circuit until discharge from the recovery ward.
e See Table 1 for codes and specifications of each monitor.
X monitor in use in the manner described in Table 1 # capnograph is defined to detect apnoea only" hen the patient is not intubated (eg via sampling catheter in oxygen mask).
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, Nil. 5, October, 1993 children, the breathing system was assumed to be a "T" piece and the ventilator an "occluder"; the "standard" anaesthetic was assumed to be 33070 oxygen, 67070 nitrous oxide plus a volatile agent. Paper. A number corresponding to each paper in this symposium was entered in this space if the incident was considered to be relevant to that paper (see incidents la, Ib, 2a, 3a and 5a in Figure I , which are of relevance, respectively, to references 6 and 7,8,9, 8 and 10, and 11).
Check. If an assessor could not decipher the handwriting on a report with certainty or was uncertain about a rule or convention, "C" was entered in this space so that this could be discussed with the other assessors at the next meeting (see incidents Ib and 3a in Figure I ).
Editing of Individual Scores
Once a group of incidents had been scored, a series of meetings was held. At each meeting, if "C" had been recorded the assessor was able to request clarification of any aspect of the rules before finalizing his or her score for that particular incident. The opportunity was used at this stage to progressively make the wording of the rules more explicit. I f the group consensus was that the original score for such an incident was correct, the "C" was left in the space to indicate that the score for this incident had been checked by the group (see incident Ib in Figure I ). If the group disagreed with any aspect of the assessor's score for this incident, this was ringed, the correct code was inserted, and "X" or "Y" was noted within the ring (see incident 3a in Figure I ). An "X" error was recorded if the error was due to failure on the part of the assessor to read the incident accurately or to interpret the rules correctly. A "Y" error was recorded if the assessor had interpreted the incident differently from the rest of the group (see incident 3a in Figure I) . After each member of the group had discussed their incidents marked "C", the numbers of those incidents common to all members of the group were revealed by the last author (SH), who had conducted the randomization and was not an assessor, and the scores for these were jointly checked. If there was any disagreement, consensus was reached and an "X" or "Y" error recorded as necessary for each incorrect scoring category. At the end of the meeting the data forms were collected for entry into a database.
Data Entry
One of the authors (RKW) checked each form for completeness and consistency. I f any category had not been scored the original report was checked, the matter Anaesthesia and /f1lensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 was discussed with the relevant assessor, and the correct score was entered into the form. Those omissions that did occur were inadvertent. The data from the forms was then transferred to a centralized computer database. FoxPro TM (Fox Software Inc. Perrysburg, Ohio, USA), a proprietary database program, was used for data entry, storage, manipulation and retrieval.
RESULTS

Incident Descriptors
The 2000th incident was incident No. 1901a, indicating that 99 incidents were supernumerary ones on original report forms. In 73 cases there were 2 incidents on a form, in 10 cases there were 3, and in 2 cases there were 4. 1256 incidents were considered "applicable" to this study. 17 of these incidents occurred during stage "PRE", 891 during "INT", 208 during "N-INT" and 140 during "REC" (see Table  3 for definitions of the stages). 194 incidents were "flagged" and will be considered in a future publication.
Actual Incident Detection
604 (48070) of the 1256 incidents were scored HO (i.e. "human detected"). Which monitor detected the remaining 652 incidents, each scored MD (52070 of the 1256 incidents), is shown in Figure 2 .
Theoretical Incident Detection
The frequencies with which the clinical situations (conventions) occurred is ranked in Table 4 . The frequencies with which each monitor, used on its own, would have detected incidents, and with which each would have done so before the potential for organ damage, are presented in Figure 3 . A comparison of actual monitor detection with theoretical monitor detection is presented in Table 5 .
DISCUSSION
Actual Incident Detection
Nearly two thirds (1256, 63070) of the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS were considered applicable to this study of the role of monitors in association with general anaesthesia. The role of monitors in other circumstances (e.g. regional anaesthesia) will be considered elsewhere in this symposium. II Of these applicable incidents, over half (52070) were actually detected by monitors in use at the time (see Figure 2 ). It is highly likely that this figure would have been slightly greater (at least 55070) if monitors had been used throughout the reporting period in accordance with the current guidelines of the Australian & New Zealand College of Anaesthetists. 12 Oximetry was recommended for every case six months after the start of AIMS, and capnography was recommended for every intubated and/or ventilated patient four and a half years after the start of AIMS.
Pulse oximetery (27070) and capnography (24070) together first detected over half of all the monitor detected incidents and the ECG just under one fifth (of which 98070 were simple brady-and tachyarrhythmias). If the ECG "bleep" is turned off and a pulse oximeter always used and its more informative modulated tone have detected first had the "bleep" of the [:CG been "turned down" and the modulated pulse tone of the oximeter been relied upon to detect brady-and tachyarrythmias.
relied upon, then pulse oximetry and capnography could confidently be predicted to first detect two-thirds of all monitor-detected incidents and one-third of all incidents occurring in association with general anaesthesia. Blood pressure monitors detected 12070 of all monitor-detected incidents; nearly half of these were detected by invasive blood pressure monitoring, although this was used in only 15% of patients. The low pressure alarm detected 8% of incidents. This rate may decrease as the use of capnography increases, but the importance of this monitor will not; the need for a "belt' and braces" approach to the mechanical ventilation of the paralysed patient has been emphasised elsewhere. 7
• Il
The oxygen analyser detected nearly 4% of monitordetected incidents; this figure would have been higher had the oxygen analyser always been properly used. " The frequency with which hypoxic mixtures are still administered underlies the necessity for this monitor always to be used. Although this problem will ultimately be picked up by the pulse oximeter, it is highly desirable that it be detected as soon as possible. A detailed analysis of the range of incidents actually FIGURE 3 Tile frequencies with which each monitor. used on its own, WOUld tlleorctically flave detected incidents, had they been allowed to evolve (stippled bar), ranked by the frequency with which they would have detected the incident belore any potential for organ damage (solid bar) The number of incidents ftrst detected in which the monitor was deftned as a ftrst detector of that incident (i.e. as a "front-line" monitor).
c The number of incidents in which the monitor ftrst detected incidents when defined as a "back-up" monitor but "front-line" monitors defmed to detect the incident sooner were not in use. d The number of incidents in which the monitor first detected incidents when defined as a "back-up" monitor when a "front-line" monitor was in use but was used in an inappropriate manner (e.g. alarms disabled). e Mean percentages. detected by each of the monitors will be considered elsewhere in this symposium.
A pressure gauge, high pressure alarm, spirometer and pulse meter each first detected 1-2% of incidents; the remainder each detected less than one in 300 incidents. Each of these can, however, be a valuable monitor for patient management even though they have a low yield with respect to first detecting incidents.
Theoretical Incident Detection
Some interesting information arose from classifying all the incidents into identifiable clinical situations in order to apply monitor scoring conventions (see Table  2 ). Over 40070 of all incidents are accounted for by 5, 60% by 10, and nearly 80% by only 20 clinical situations (see Table 4 ). 98% of the first 1256 incidents reported fell into only 60 categories. This has implications for teaching junior staff and for setting priorities for problem-preventing and for problemsolving protocols.
The theoretical analysis of whether each monitor, used on its own, would have been expected to detect each of the 1256 applicable incidents, had they been allowed to evolve, should be of interest to those setting priorities for departments with limited resources. A pulse oximeter would have detected 82% of all incidents and would have detected nearly 60% before any potential for organ damage (see Figure 3 ). Oximetry plus capnography would have detected 88% of all incidents (65% without potential for organ damage). This figure is similar to that arrived at by the reviewers of 1175 anaesthetic-related "closed" malpractice claims in the USA when they retrospectively assessed the role of monitoring devices in the prevention of anaesthetic mishaps. They concluded that 57% of deaths may have been preventable had an array of monitors been used in an ideal manner, and that 93070 of the monitor preventable mishaps could have been prevented by the combination of pulse oximetry and capnography. 15 With the addition of a blood pressure monitor 93% of the 1256 incidents would have been detected (but still only 65% without potential for oxygen damage). Adding an oxygen analyser would have allowed 95 % of incidents to be detected (67% without potential for organ damage); this increase reflects those incidents in which an increase in inspired oxygen would be detected at the 5 minute "scan" (e.g. entrainment of ventilator driving gas, "low" nitrous oxide). The subsequent addition of any other monitor (including the ECG) increases the yield by less than 0.5% for each monitor. 2% of the incidents which occurred were considered not to be able to be reliably detected by any of the 17 monitors in the array (e.g. vaporizer leaks, Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 awareness). Hence, none of the monitors were "scored" in the conventions for these incidents (see Figure 2 ). Although a "low-yield" monitor, a high pressure alarm is always worth using because it detects a dangerous situation early. An ECG, defibrillator, spirometer and thermometer should be available, and should be used when needed or indicated. A neuromuscular junction monitor should, ideally, be used whenever muscle relaxants are used, but has a low yield in terms of first detection of problems. The stethoscope was rarely used in the continuous auscultation mode, but is valuable if the other monitors are unavailable. The stethoscope is considered in detail elsewhere in this symposium. I.
The validity of the assumptions made in Table 2 with respect to the sequence in which monitors would theoretically detect incidents may be tested to some extent by the analysis present~d in Table 5 . It is evident that when a monitor actually did detect an incident it would have been predicted to do so in an average of 85% of cases. This should by no means be expected to be 100%, as any monitor will detect other incidents on occasions, but were deemed to be unlikely to do so reliably. These data are analysed in greater detail in papers on each monitor elsewhere in this symposium.
Amongst the 200 incidents each assessed by the 5 assessors, there were 164 "X" errors (representing 2.3% of the 5000 categories scored) and 81 "Y" errors (representing 1.6% of the 5000 categories scored). Thus there was, on average, disagreement by one assessor in one of the scoring categories in about 4% of incidents. Unfortunately, it was not possible to apportion the X and Y errors to each category with accuracy as some assessors failed to indicate the category in which the error had been made on the data forms. This deficiency will be addressed in future studies. There are over 1000 incident reports which have been received but which have not yet been subjected to analysis. It is intended to carry out a number of controlled prospective studies to determine the levels of agreement reached by new assessors who base their assessments on an explicit body of rules and conventions.
There is no doubt that many would disagree with some of the chosen characteristics of the monitors and with the arrays of monitors chosen for use during the various stages of anaesthesia for the theoretical analysis. However, the data can readily be re-analysed with changes in the rules and conventions.
Implications for Monitoring Practice
Although there will continue to be debate, 17 it is our view that the "Monitoring Guidelines of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists" 12 and the recommendations made in the "International Standards for a Safe Practice of Anaesthesia" 'A have been thoroughly vindicated by the patterns revealed in this study. The requirements that a pulse oximeter "must be exclusively available for every anaesthetised patient from January 1st, 1989" and that "a carbon dioxide monitor must be exclusively available for every intubated and ventilated patient" from January 1st,1992,12 demonstrate that the correct sequence for monitor acquisition was chosen intuitively.
Amongst the incidents analysed, many involved problems which should have been detected early, but progressed because a monitor was not available, was available but was not in use, or was in use but was being used incorrectly (e.g. with an alarm incorrectly set or turned off). Details of these instances will be provided elsewhere in this symposium. No anaesthetist should proceed with an elective procedure without checking and, where possible, calibrating the available monitors, and then using them appropriately. There is no doubt that many incidents would have been detected earlier had the monitoring guidelines 12 always been followed and the monitors used correctly. At best, these instances constitute "rule-based" errors; at worst, they constitute "violations". 18 There is evidence that attention needs to be directed to this area. 19 Professional bodies representing anaesthetists in several countries have expressed an interest in starting national incident monitoring studies using a standard international form. A new form is being designed incorporating improvements suggested by our analysis of the AIMS data and ideas supplied by cognitive psychologists. Proper assessment of the validity of this instrument and multi-national participation will pave the way for comparisons between countries with different training programmes and different types of equipment, and will provide the necessary information for the design of appropriately focussed prospective studies. 19 It is hoped that incident monitoring will continue to provide powerful evidence on which to base applications for resources to improve the quality of anaesthetic practice and patient safety.
